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AN INSURMOUNTABLE OBSTACLE:
DENYING DEFERENCE TO THE BIA’S SOCIAL
VISIBILITY REQUIREMENT
Kathleen Kersh*
In the last fifteen years, the Board of Immigration Appeals has imposed a require-
ment that persons seeking asylum based on membership in a particular social group
must establish that the social group is “socially visible” throughout society. This
Comment argues that the social visibility requirement should be denied administra-
tive deference on several grounds. The requirement should be denied Chevron
deference because Congress’s intent behind the Refugee Act of 1980 is clear and
unambiguous and, alternatively, the requirement is an impermissible interpretation
of the statute. The requirement is also arbitrary and capricious under the Adminis-
trative Procedures Act. This Comment argues that courts should instead follow the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees’ definition of a particular social
group, in which social visibility is one of two methods to establish a particular social
group. An adoption of this framework would serve Congress’s intent to adhere to
the United States’ international obligations.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1995, a young woman arrived in Brownsville, Texas after fleeing
her abusive husband in Guatemala. She had married him in Guatemala at
age sixteen. Immediately after the wedding, her husband began sexually
and physically abusing her.1 He never left her alone; he followed her to
work every day and made her accompany him to the local cantina at night,
where he would become inebriated and violent.2 When her period was
once late, he beat her so violently that he dislocated her jawbone. When
she did not want to abort the pregnancy, he kicked her in her spine.3 He
not only raped her repeatedly, but also passed sexually transmitted diseases
on to her from his other sexual encounters, and he repeatedly kicked her
in the genitalia.4
The woman tried to run away to relatives in other parts of Guate-
mala, but her husband always followed her. One night, she attempted to
commit suicide. Her husband told her she could die, but she would never
be able to leave him.5 She asked the police for help, and they issued a
summons for her husband. When he failed to appear, the police took no
further action. Twice, she called the Guatemalan police for help, but they
never responded.6 Once, she appeared before a Guatemalan judge, but he
told her he would not interfere in her domestic disputes.7 There were no
domestic violence shelters or similar organizations in Guatemala that could
help her. Eventually, she was able to get help fleeing from her husband and
come to the United States, where she sought asylum. However, the Board
of Immigration Appeals denied her asylum request because victims of
spousal abuse were not a recognized “faction” of Guatemalan society.8
The woman was ordered to be removed to Guatemala and to the life-
threatening abuse she suffered there.9
One year earlier, in 1994, a young Togolese woman arrived at the
Newark International Airport.10 After her father’s death, the woman’s
aunt forced her into a polygamous marriage with a man thirty years her
1. These are the facts of R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 908 (B.I.A. 1999).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 908–09.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 918.
9. The applicant in R-A- was granted asylum in 2009, after the Department of Home-
land Security conceded the applicant’s eligibility for asylum. See Brief ex rel Rodi Alvarado Pena
to the Attorney General of the United States at 13–14, R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (B.I.A. 1999).
The Immigration Judge issued a summary decision that did not address social visibility and suffi-
cient particularity concerns.
10. These are the facts of Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357 (B.I.A. 1996).
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senior.11 Under tribal custom, the woman’s husband and aunt planned for
her to submit to Female Genital Mutilation (“FGM”) before the marriage
was consummated. If she were forced to submit to FGM, parts of her
genitalia would be cut away with a knife. She knew she would bleed ex-
tensively, her vagina might be sewn together, and she might have perma-
nent and life-threatening complications.12 Unfortunately, she could not
relocate anywhere in Togo. She knew the police would refuse to help her
because, even though the Togolese government knew FGM existed, it did
nothing to prevent young girls from being submitted to it. In fact, she
believed the police would actually help her aunt find her, and there were
few places she could hide from the government or anyone else in such a
small country.13 With the help of her sister, the young woman fled to
Germany and then to the United States, where she claimed and was ulti-
mately granted, asylum.14
The women in these cases share similar circumstances. Both were
harmed in their country for reasons ultimately linked to their gender. Both
women lived in countries where the police would not help them. Both
women were unable to hide anywhere in their home country. Both feared
persecution for reasons known only privately, rather than by society as a
whole. The difference between these two cases ultimately rests on each
woman’s ability to fulfill the Board of Immigration Appeals’ “social visibil-
ity” requirement, which demands that a person’s protected class must be
perceived by the society in which she lives.15 This Comment discusses the
inconsistent application of this requirement, and the way it shirks the U.S.
government’s international obligations by forcing deserving asylum appli-
cants to return home to their persecutors.
* *
Asylum law is one of the most complex legal systems in immigration
law today. It blends immigration legal issues with international obligations
and human rights interests. The Refugee Act of 1980,16 now § 101(a)(42)
of the Immigration and Nationality Act,17 was the codification of the
United States’ international obligations as parties to the 1967 Protocol re-
11. Id. at 358.
12. Id. at 361.
13. Id. at 359.
14. Id.
15. See R-A, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 924–25 (B.I.A. 1999) (noting that while the two
applicants’ situations are similar, the applicant in Kasinga had established that the practice of FGM
in Togo was widespread and acknowledged throughout Togolese society, while the applicant in
R-A- had failed to establish the same for spousal abuse in Guatemala).
16. Refugee Act, Pub. L. 96-212, 94 Stat. 107 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1521, et seq.).
17. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A)(2000).
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lating to the Status of Refugees.18 As a signatory to the 1967 Protocol, the
United States agreed to accept into American law the virtually identical
text of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,19 and the
U.S. has since become a key player in the international refugee
community.20
Section 101(a)(42) of the Immigration and Nationality Act permits
the U.S. government discretion to grant asylum to an applicant present in
the United States who qualifies as a “refugee.”21 A “refugee” is defined in
the Act as “any person who is outside any country of such person’s nation-
ality . . . and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or
unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country be-
cause of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or po-
litical opinion.”22 This definition essentially creates three main require-
ments for an asylum applicant: first, he or she must prove a well-founded
fear of persecution; second, he or she must be a member of a protected
class (race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or a member of a partic-
ular social group); and third, he or she must prove the persecution feared is
on account of membership in a protected class, also known as the nexus
requirement.23
This Comment focuses on the way the Board of Immigration Ap-
peals (“BIA” or “the Board”), the administrative agency authorized by
Congress to interpret the Immigration and Nationality Act through formal
adjudications,24 has defined membership of a particular social group. The
Supreme Court has held that appellate circuits should grant deference to
the BIA’s interpretations of asylum provisions under the Immigration and
18. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 2, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606
U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter 1967 Protocol]. The 1967 Protocol and its parent treaty, the United
Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, created an international definition for a
refugee and outlined elements of eligibility for refugee status.
19. United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1, July 28, 1951,
19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 [hereinafter “Refugee Convention”]; 1967 Protocol, supra note 18, at art.
1, para. 1.
20. 2013 UNHCR Regional Operations Profile – North America and the Caribbean, UNITED
NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES (2013), http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/
vtx/page?page=49e492086&submit=GO (noting that “in 2012 the United States accepted more
people for [refugee] resettlement than any other country in the world”).
21. INA § 1101(a)(42)(A).
22. Id.
23. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B) (2012).
24. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a) (2009); see also INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424–25
(1999) (“The Attorney General, while retaining ultimate authority, has vested the BIA with
power to exercise the discretion and authority conferred upon the Attorney General by law’ in
the course of ‘considering and determining cases before it.”) (internal citations omitted).
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Nationality Act.25 The Comment discusses the way the Board of Immigra-
tion Appeals has deviated from the purpose and objective of the Refugee
Act and the 1967 Protocol by imposing a social visibility requirement to
establish a particular social group. The Comment builds on Kristin A.
Bresnahan’s note in the Berkeley Journal of International Law, which ar-
gues the social visibility requirement should not be granted administrative
deference under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc. and is an unlawful result of arbitrary and capricious reasoning.26 Bres-
nahan calls for the U.S. government’s adoption of the United Nation’s
High Commissioner for Refugee’s27 definition of a particular social group,
which provides a particular social group may be defined either by a com-
mon, immutable characteristic its members share, or because the group is
perceived as a unit in society.
This Comment accepts Bresnahan’s main argument that the social
visibility requirement is not a permissible interpretation of the statute and
thus does not deserve Chevron deference. However, this Comment argues
that the BIA should not be granted Chevron deference not only because
the social visibility requirement is an impermissible interpretation of the
statute (a Chevron Step Two argument), but because Congress’s intent be-
hind the language of the Refugee Act is clear and unambiguous and does
not leave room for the BIA’s imputation of the requirement (a Chevron
Step One argument). Where Bresnahan and the BIA have invoked the
interpretive cannon of ejusdem generis to interpret the language of the Ref-
ugee Act, this Comment analyzes the social visibility requirement under
the cannon of noscitur a sociis, which is more consistent with Congressional
intent.
Part I of this Comment discusses the development of the social visi-
bility doctrine and analyzes how the Seventh and Third Circuits have re-
fused to grant administrative deference to the BIA and have found social
visibility arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act.
Part II argues against granting Chevron deference to the BIA’s interpreta-
tion of a particular social group because Congress has already unambigu-
ously expressed its intent behind the definition of a particular social group.
Alternatively, Part II reiterates Bresnahan’s argument that the social visibil-
ity requirement is an impermissible interpretation of the statute. Part III
then demonstrates how the BIA’s reasoning behind the creation of the
25. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 424–25; see also Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984) (holding that a court should grant
deference to an administrative agency charged with interpreting a particular statute where Con-
gress has not directly spoken to the precise question at issue and where the agency’s interpreta-
tion is based on a “permissible construction” of the statute).
26. See Kristin A. Bresnahan, The Board of Immigration Appeals’s New Social Visibility Test for
Determining Membership of a Particular Social Group in Asylum Claims and its Legal Policy Implications,
29 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 649 (2011).
27. Hereinafter “UNHCR.”
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social visibility requirement is arbitrary and capricious because it is incon-
sistent with prior agency interpretation and because the BIA failed to con-
sider relevant factors, such as the particular social group’s visibility to the
persecutor, in creating the requirement. Finally, Part IV briefly explores
why social visibility is an ineffective tool to allay “floodgates” concerns,
the fear that an overbroad definition of refugee will cause an inundation of
applicants, clogging the court system.
This Comment argues that the social visibility requirement forces ad-
judicators to consider factors irrelevant both to Congress’s purpose in cre-
ating the Refugee Act and the purpose of the authors of the 1967
Protocol. Consequently, its revocation would not only prevent the denial
of asylum status to certain qualifying refugees, but would, as Bresnahan
also argues, promote a consistent and fair application of the law.
I. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF “PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP”
The term “particular social group” is not defined in the Refugee
Act, the 1951 Refugee Convention, or the 1967 Protocol, from which the
definition of refugee is derived. This Part explores how the BIA’s defini-
tion of a particular social group has developed and transformed from the
“immutable characteristic” test described in Matter of Acosta28 to an impu-
tation of a social visibility requirement in recent BIA decisions. Part I.A
briefly discusses the Acosta test and its use of the ejusdem generis interpretive
cannon. Part I.B discusses UNHCR’s incorporation of the Acosta immuta-
ble characteristic test and the social perception test popular in other inter-
national jurisdictions. Part I.C analyzes the BIA’s gradual deviation from
the immutable characteristic test to an incorporation of a social visibility
requirement. Part I.D explores the express rejection of the social visibility
requirement by the Third and Seventh Circuits, including the important
administrative law and practical arguments set forth in these decisions.
A. The BIA’s Acosta Standard
In Matter of Acosta, the BIA established a requirement that a particular
social group consist of members who share a common, immutable charac-
teristic.29 The BIA held members of a taxi cooperative did not share a
common, immutable characteristic because they could avoid persecution
by changing their career and discontinuing membership in the coopera-
tive.30 In its analysis, the BIA invoked the interpretive canon of ejusdem
generis and examined the common characteristics of the other four grounds
protected by the statute: political opinion, nationality, race and religion.
The doctrine of ejusdem generis, which means literally “of the same kind,”
28. Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233–34 (B.I.A. 1985), overruled on other grounds by
Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987).
29. Id. at 233.
30. Id. at 234.
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holds that words used in a group should be interpreted in a manner consis-
tent with other words in the same group.31 The BIA concluded that all
grounds “described persecution aimed at an immutable characteristic”
which is “either beyond the power of an individual to change or is so
fundamental to individual identity or conscience that it ought not to be
required to be changed.”32 The “common, immutable characteristic” test
thus formed the foundational standard for the definition of a particular
social group in American asylum law.33
B. The UNHCR Guidelines
The 1967 Protocol charges the UNHCR with supervising the appli-
cation of treaty provisions.34 As a result, UNHCR interpretations of the
Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol have been given considerable
weight in American courts. In 2002, the UNHCR published the Guide-
lines on International Protection: Membership of a Particular Social Group to pro-
vide legal interpretive guidance on the definition of membership of a
particular social group.35 The definition in the UNHCR Guidelines
merges the immutable characteristic definition established in Acosta with
the Australian “social perception” approach.36 Where the immutable char-
acteristic test focuses on characteristics that are unchangeable, but may or
may not be visible to society, the social perception approach focuses on the
“external perceptions” of the group and the group’s ability to be identified
as a “social unit” by society.37
The UNHCR Guidelines define a particular social group as “a group
of persons who share a common characteristic other than their risk of
being persecuted, or who are perceived as a group by society. The com-
mon characteristic must be innate, unchangeable, or otherwise fundamen-
tal to one’s identity, conscience or the exercise of one’s human rights.”38
By incorporating the Acosta immutable characteristic standard into its defi-
31. Id. at 233.
32. This Comment argues that ejusdem generis is not the appropriate interpretive canon to
analyze the definition of a particular social group. The more appropriate doctrine is noscitur a
sociis (a word is known by its associates); see infra, note 91 and accompanying text.
33. Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233.
34. 1967 Protocol, supra note 18, at art. 2, para. 1.
35. U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Guidelines on International Protection: “Mem-
bership of a Particular Social Group” Within the Context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or
Its Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, U.N. Doc. HRC/GIP/02/02 (May 7, 2002) [herein-
after UNHCR Guidelines].
36. UNHCR Guidelines, supra note 35, at para. 7 (The social perception approach re-
quires a group share a common characteristic which makes them a “cognizable group or sets
them apart from society at large.”).
37. See Applicant A v. Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1997) 190 CLR 225
(Austl.) (discussing a Chinese couple’s qualification as members of a particular social group as a
result of their fear of persecution from China’s one child policy).
38. UNHCR Guidelines, supra note 35, at para. 11 (emphasis added).
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nition of a particular social group, the UNHCR advised that a common,
immutable characteristic was sufficient to establish a particular social
group. The use of the word “or” in the definition indicates that the
UNHCR intended to add the social perception approach as an alternative,
but not a co-requisite, to the immutable characteristic approach. The
Guidelines state that while the two approaches often converge, the social
perception approach can cover certain characteristics, such as occupation,
that are neither immutable nor fundamental to human dignity, but that the
Refugee Convention is still designed to protect.39
Finally, the UNHCR Guidelines also emphasize that cohesiveness,
internal association or recognition by members of a group, is not a require-
ment to establish a particular social group.40 In other words, members of a
particular social group are required to share a common characteristic or be
a visible faction of society, but they do not have to know of other group
members or associate with each other as a group.41 The UNHCR noted
that women, for example, share a common characteristic and are seen as a
social group in society, but do not necessarily associate with one another
based on that characteristic.42
C. The Emergence of the BIA’s Social Visibility Requirement
The BIA has used the social perception approach in the UNHCR
definition of a particular social group to impute a requirement that a group
be socially visible: that a shared characteristic of a particular social group is
“generally recognizable by others in the community.”43 The following
cases illustrate how the imposition of the social visibility requirement by
the BIA diverges from the definition of particular social group in the
UNHCR Guidelines and how the BIA has subsequently confused estab-
lishing a particular social group with other elements necessary to prove
asylum eligibility.
1. Matter of R-A- (1999)
Matter of R-A- is the first case in which the BIA imputed a social
visibility requirement to the definition of a particular social group.44 The
BIA held “Guatemalan women who have been intimately involved with
39. See UNHCR Guidelines, supra note 35, at para. 13 (noting that even if participating
in a particular occupation is “neither unchangeable nor a fundamental aspect of human identity,”
it may still constitute “a particular social group” if in “society they are recognized as a group
which sets them apart”). But cf. Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 234 (finding members of a taxi
cooperative did not share an immutable characteristic because they could change occupations).
40. UNHCR Guidelines, supra note 35, at para. 15.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 586 (B.I.A. 2008).
44. It should be noted that the BIA decided R-A-, before the UNHCR Guidelines were
published, and therefore, the Guidelines are not mentioned in this section of the argument.
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Guatemalan male companions, who believe that women are to live under
male domination” was not a particular social group because spousal abuse
victims were not perceived by Guatemalans as a distinct faction of Guate-
malan society.45 In its analysis, the BIA acknowledged that it was deviating
from its own precedent,46 but held the imputation of a new social visibility
standard was consistent with the other four protected grounds: race, relig-
ion, nationality and political opinion. The BIA held that because the other
four protected grounds were “typically” and “frequently” separate and dis-
tinct groups in society, such distinction must now be an absolute require-
ment for a particular social group.47 However, at no point in its opinion
did the BIA specifically address how the other four protected grounds are
recognized by members of society as visibly distinct, nor did it provide an
explanation as to why a factor (social visibility) that “generally” applies to
the other four protected grounds should be a requirement to establish a par-
ticular social group. Therefore, in Matter of R-A-, the Board not only set
aside its own Acosta immutable characteristic standard and imported a so-
cial perception requirement to the definition of a particular social group,48
but it provided no real analytical basis for doing so.
2. Matter of C-A- (2006)
In Matter of C-A-,49 the BIA upheld the social visibility requirement,
holding that “noncriminal informants working against the Cali cartel” did
not constitute a particular social group because they were not “visible” to
the Cali cartel or “other members of society.”50 In its decision, the BIA
referenced the UNHCR Guidelines and acknowledged the UNHCR’s
incorporation of the Acosta immutable characteristic test and the social
perception test.51 The BIA found that the applicant failed the Acosta test
because he voluntarily chose to be an informant, and was aware of the risk
of danger in doing so.52 Therefore, the BIA turned to the social visibility
prong of the UNCHR definition, confirming “visibility” as “an important
element in identifying the existence of a particular social group.”53 The
BIA’s rejection of the applicant’s particular social group on social visibility
grounds misconstrued the UNHCR Guidelines to require that voluntary
45. R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 918 (B.I.A. 1999).
46. Id.
47. See C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 961 (B.I.A. 2006).
48. R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 917–19.
49. 23 I. & N. Dec. 951 (B.I.A. 2006).
50. Id. at 960.
51. Id. at 956.
52. Id. at 958–59.
53. Id. at 960.
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informants be visible and recognizable in society in order to constitute a
particular social group.54
While the BIA seemed to rely on the “social perception” prong of
the UNHCR’s definition of particular social group in its Guidelines, its
analysis was inconsistent with the UNHCR’s definition of social percep-
tion. The BIA held that Cali informants were not socially visible because
they “intended to remain unknown and undiscovered,” and that only
members who were known to the public were socially visible.55 By con-
trast, the UNHCR Guidelines’ definition of social perception requires
only that the “group” be cognizable, rather than the individual members.
Further, the BIA’s analysis placed too much power on the subjective per-
ceptions of Columbian society.56 The BIA held that the Cali informants
were not visible because, as secret informants, their identities were not
actually known in the community, rather than determining whether the
group is objectively cognizable as a separate faction in Columbian soci-
ety.57 Thus, while the BIA’s decision in Matter of C-A- appeared to draw
on the UNHCR Guidelines definition of a particular social group, the
BIA actually created its own social visibility requirement that deviates from
its own precedent and the UNHCR interpretation.
3. Matter of A-M-E- (2007)
In Matter of A-M-E-, the BIA held that “wealthy Guatemalans” could
not constitute a particular social group because they were not “perceived as
a group by society.”58 The respondents in the case were wealthy
Guatemalans who feared criminal extortion by unidentified assailants be-
cause of their wealthy status and ability to pay ransom. Here, the BIA
looked to the “context” of the country in which persecution was feared in
order to determine the social visibility of the respondents’ proposed social
group. Specifically, the BIA looked to incidents of violence and kidnap-
ping and found that because violence was widespread across many socio-
economic levels in Guatemala, wealthy Guatemalans did not constitute a
recognizable group in society. As a result, the BIA found that the respon-
dents failed to establish that their group was socially visible.59
This decision illustrates the BIA’s repeated use of the social visibility
requirement in lieu of the nexus requirement. The BIA claimed the fact
that violence was widespread meant that wealthy Guatemalans did not
constitute a recognizable group in society. However, whether violence is
54. See Fatma E. Marouf, The Emerging Importance of “Social Visibility” in Defining a “Partic-
ular Social Group”, 27 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 47, 64 (2008).
55. C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 960.
56. Marouf, supra note 54, at 64.
57. C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 960.
58. See A-M-E & J-G-U-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69, 74 (B.I.A. 2007).
59. A-M-E- & J-G-U, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 75.
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widespread has no bearing on whether wealthy Guatemalans are socially
visible. Rather, widespread violence might indicate that wealthy
Guatemalans are not attacked on account of their wealthy status, but rather as
a result of general violence. Moreover, the fact that people suffer from
violent attacks or robberies across different socioeconomic groups does not
necessarily mean the wealthy would not be persecuted because of their
wealth. In making this presumption, the BIA used violence to other
groups as the litmus for the social visibility test and consequently conflated
the nexus requirement with a respondent’s burden to establish she belongs
to a particular social group.
4. Matter of S-E-G- (2008)
The BIA’s biggest deviation from the UNHCR Guidelines defini-
tion of a “particular social group” occurred in the Matter of S-E-G- deci-
sion.60 The BIA held “Salvadoran youth who have been subjected to
recruitment efforts by MS13 and who have rejected or resisted member-
ship in the gang”61 and “family members of such Salvadoran youth” did
not constitute a particular social group because they were not socially visi-
ble.62 Unlike in Matter of C-A- and Matter of A-M-E-, where the BIA used
the social visibility approach because it found the respondents’ particular
social groups did not share a common immutable characteristic, the BIA in
Matter of S-E-G- held that members of this group did share a common,
immutable characteristic: their past recruitment by gangs.63 Nevertheless,
the BIA found the particular social group failed because it did not possess
requisite “well-defined boundaries” and “a recognized level of social visibil-
ity.”64 In so holding, the BIA morphed the “either immutable characteris-
tic approach or social perception approach” definition of particular social
group in the UNHCR Guidelines and created a new, higher standard re-
quiring a social group to share a characteristic that is both immutable and
socially visible.
Similar to its approach in Matter of A-M-E-, the Board looked to
country conditions and incidences of crime and violence on the entire
population to determine whether the respondents’ social group was so-
cially visible. Here, the BIA found Salvadoran youth who were recruited
by gangs and refused to join were not socially visible because they did not
experience a “higher incidence of crime than the rest of the popula-
60. S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 579 (B.I.A. 2008).
61. Id. at 585 (the full name of the respondents’ first particular social group was “Salvado-
ran youth who have been subjected to recruitment efforts by MS-13 and who have rejected or
resisted membership in the gang based on their own personal, moral, and religious opposition to
the gang’s values and activities”).
62. Id. at 584–87.
63. Id. at 585.
64. Id. at 582.
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tion.”65 The Board held that Salvadorans who resisted gang recruitment
could not constitute a particular social group because they were “not in a
substantially different situation from anyone who has crossed the gang, or
who is perceived to be a threat to the gang’s interests.”66 Here, the BIA
again conflated establishing a particular social group with the nexus re-
quirement by mistakenly looking to the presence of persecution outside of
respondents’ particular social group to evidence the persecutor’s intent (or
lack thereof) to harm respondents on account of their refusal to join the
gang.
The fact that gang members threatened other members of El Salva-
doran society—that Salvadorans who resist gang recruitment were not the
exclusive recipients of gang violence—is not relevant to whether or not
they are a particular social group in Salvadoran society. If anything, the
BIA should have understood gang members’ generalized violence to un-
dermine the applicant’s asylum claim on nexus grounds: that the applicant
could not prove the gang members targeted him because he refused gang
recruitment and not as an act of random violence. Instead, the BIA applied
an unmerited social visibility requirement to reject a particular social group
that would otherwise succeed under the Acosta and UNHCR standards.
D. Rejection of Social Visibility by the Third and Seventh Circuits
Under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, a
court should grant deference to an administrative agency charged with in-
terpreting a particular statute where Congress has not directly spoken to
the precise question at issue and where the agency’s interpretation is based
on a “permissible construction” of the statute. Five appellate circuits have
granted deference to the BIA and adopted the social visibility require-
ment;67 however the Third and Seventh Circuits have expressly rejected
it,68 and the remaining circuits have neither rejected nor adopted it.
In Gatimi v. Holder, the Seventh Circuit reversed the BIA’s holding
that defectors of the Kenyan Mungiki gang could not constitute a particu-
lar social group because the respondent did not possess “any characteristics
65. Id. at 587.
66. Id.
67. Scatambuli v. Holder, 558 F.3d 53, 54, 58 (1st Cir. 2009) (“BIA’s determination that
applicants, who had been informants to United States government regarding drug smuggling
ring, lacked social visibility, and thus were not members of particular social group [‘PSG’], was
supported by substantial evidence.”); Santos-Lemus v. Mukasey, 542 F.3d 738, 738 (9th Cir.
2008) (“[Y]oung men in El Salvador resisting gang violence” were not a PSG); Davila-Mejia v.
Mukasey, 531 F.3d 624, 628–29 (8th Cir. 2008) (rejecting the PSG “competing [Guatemalan]
family business owners”); Ucelo-Gomez v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 70, 72–73 (2d Cir. 2007) (re-
jecting “affluent Guatemalans” as a PSG); Castillo-Arias v. U.S. Att’y. Gen., 446 F.3d 1190,
1194–95, 1197 (11th Cir. 2006) (determining informants on a Columbian drug cartel were not a
PSG).
68. Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Att’y Gen., 663 F.3d 582, 582 (3d Cir. 2011); Gatimi v.
Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 615 (7th Cir. 2009).
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that would cause others in Kenyan society to recognize him as a former
member of Mungiki.”69 The Seventh Circuit declined to grant Chevron
deference to the Board, holding the social visibility requirement was in-
consistent with previous opinions and the requirement “makes no
sense.”70 In his opinion, Judge Richard Posner noted the Board had fre-
quently found non-socially visible characteristics constituted particular so-
cial groups, such as “young women of a tribe that practices female genital
mutilation but who have not been subjected to it,”71 homosexuals,72 for-
mer members of the national police,73 and former military leaders or land
owners.74 Posner found the BIA’s inconsistent application of the social vis-
ibility requirement led to arbitrary decision making and thus did not merit
a grant of deference.75 Further, the court held the Board’s social visibility
requirement had the absurd effect of expecting a member of a group
targeted for persecution to flaunt their identity in society so that they
would be socially visible, which would increase the likelihood of persecu-
tion, rather than avoid it.76
In November 2011, the Third Circuit also rejected the BIA’s social
visibility requirement in Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S.
when it overruled the BIA’s finding that “Honduran youth who have been
actively recruited by gangs but have refused to join because they oppose
gangs” did not constitute a particular social group.77 Citing Gatimi v.
Holder, the Third Circuit found the social visibility requirement was incon-
sistent with the BIA’s immutable characteristic requirement in Matter of
Acosta.78 The Court held this inconsistency rendered the social visibility
requirement an arbitrary and impermissible construction of the Refugee
Act and undeserving of a grant of deference.79 The court also reiterated
the Seventh Circuit’s finding that the social visibility requirement pro-
duced the absurd effect of denying asylum to someone who purposefully
shields his protected characteristic to avoid persecution.80 The Court
noted that someone who truly feared persecution would take steps to hide
themselves from their persecutor, yet “by attempting to avoid persecution
by blending in to the society at large, the [BIA]’s rationale would cause
69. Gatimi, 578 F.3d at 615.
70. Id.
71. Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 365–66 (B.I.A. 1996).
72. Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. 819, 822-23 (B.I.A. 1990).
73. Fuentes, 19 I. & N. Dec. 658, 662 (B.I.A. 1988).
74. Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233, 233–34 (B.I.A. 1985).
75. Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 616 (7th Cir. 2009).
76. Id.
77. 663 F.3d 582, 607 (3d Cir. 2011).
78. Id. at 604.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 607.
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them to forfeit eligibility for asylum” because they were no longer socially
visible as a member of a protected group.81
II. CHEVRON DEFERENCE
In her 2011 note, Kristin A. Bresnahan argues the BIA’s creation of
the social visibility requirement deviates from the U.S.’s international obli-
gations as signatories to the 1967 Protocol, and thus merits a denial of
Chevron deference.82 To decide whether an administrative agency’s inter-
pretation of a statute merits Chevron deference, a court must first consider
whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.83 If
Congress’s intent is clear in the construction of the statute, then the
agency must “give effect to the unambiguously” expressed intent of Con-
gress.84 Where a statute is found to be silent or ambiguous to a certain
issue, a court may grant deference to an agency’s interpretation where it is
a permissible construction of the statute.85
Bresnahan argues the BIA’s social visibility requirement does not de-
serve Chevron deference because it is contrary to Congress’s intent to in-
corporate international obligations as signatories to the 1967 Protocol.
Bresnahan argues that the Refugee Act is ambiguous with regard to the
definition of a particular social group and therefore open to administrative
interpretation. However, Bresnahan argues, the social visibility require-
ment is an impermissible interpretation and thus should not be granted
deference by courts. Part II.A argues that Congress was not ambiguous as
to the definition of a particular social group and uses the canon of noscitur a
sociis to argue that the language of the statute indicates Congress’s intent to
uniformly interpret all five protected classes in the Refugee Act––a Chev-
ron “step one” issue. Part II.B builds on Bresnahan’s argument that, even if
the statute is ambiguous, the social visibility requirement is an impermissi-
ble construction and thus undeserving of Chevron deference. However,
where Bresnahan focused on international legal principles, this Comment
will focus on statutory interpretation and the legislative history of the stat-
ute in the United States. This Comment explores why the social visibility
doctrine fails arbitrary and capricious review in the following section.
A. Chevron Step One: The Social Visibility Requirement is Inconsistent
with Congressional Intent
The Supreme Court has held that a court must reject administrative
interpretations statutory provisions that contradict Congress’s clear intent
81. Id.
82. Bresnahan, supra note 26, at 665.
83. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
837–38 (1984).
84. Id. at 842–43.
85. Id. at 843.
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behind the statute.86 A court may look to traditional tools of statutory
construction to determine Congressional intent.87 The BIA has invoked
the doctrine of ejusdem generis to interpret the definition of a particular
social group.88 Ejusdem generis, translated to mean “of the same kind,” “ap-
plies when a drafter has tacked on a catchall phrase at the end of an enu-
meration of specifics.”89 However, the BIA and UNHCR have both
expressly stated that a “particular social group” was not intended to be a
“catch-all” category that grants refugee status to everyone who does not
belong to another protected ground.90 Therefore, ejusdem generis is not the
correct cannon to interpret this provision of the Refugee Act.
Instead, the canon of noscitur a sociis, or “a word is known by its
associates,” is a more appropriate tool to define a particular social group as
one of a group of five protected grounds for establishing refugee status.
Noscitur a sociis does not frame a particular social group as a catch-all, but
rather an independent category that should be defined by the characteris-
tics of other categories in the statute. Under noscitur a sociis, each word in a
group is limited to a “general subset of the things or actions” that the
group covers.91 In this case, race, religion, nationality, political opinion
and membership in a particular social group are associated because they are
protected classes. Each subset represents a different type of characteristic
that a persecutor would try to “overcome” through persecution.92
86. Id. at 843 n.9.
87. Id.
88. See Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985) (applying ejusdem generis to inter-
pret a particular social group to mean a group of persons “all of whom share a common, immu-
table characteristic” that is either innate, such as sex, color, or kinship ties, or a “shared past
experience such as former military leadership or land ownership” to be determined on a case-
by-case basis).
89. ANTONIN SCALIA AND BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION
OF LEGAL TEXTS 199 (2012).
90. UNHCR Guidelines, supra note 35, at para. 2 (“Consistent with the language of the
[Refugee] Convention, this category cannot be interpreted as a ‘catch all’ that applies to all
persons fearing persecution.”); Castillo-Arias v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 446 F.3d 1190, 1194 (11th Cir.
2006); C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 960 (B.I.A. 2006) (quoting the UNHCR Guidelines’
provision).
91. For example, ejusdem generis is applied to a list of words with a generalized catchall
word at the end, such as “dogs, cats, horses, cattle and other animals” (where “other animals” is a
general term that can encompass all the previous-listed terms and anything else in the animal
category), whereas noscitur a sociis is applied to a list of independent yet related words, such as
“dogs, cats, horses, cattle and sheep.” Unlike “other animals,” in the first list, “sheep” in the
second list is not a generalized catchall term, but is merely another type of animal in a list of
animals. Under noscitur a sociis, all of the words in the list share a common characteristic, that they
are a type of animal. Applying the doctrine of noscitur a sociis would allow an interpreter who
did not know what a sheep was to infer that it is a type of animal, because it is one word in a long
list of other animals. The Refugee Act’s list of five protected grounds––race, religion, national-
ity, political opinion, and membership in a particular social group––is much more like the sec-
ond list in the above example than the first. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 89, at 196.
92. Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985).
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As the final court of appeal for asylum decisions,93 the Supreme
Court’s application of the interpretive canon of noscitur sociis should have
influence on the definition of a “particular social group.” For example, in
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for A Great Oregon,94 the Su-
preme Court used noscitur sociis to analyze the Secretary of the Interior’s
interpretation of the word “take” in the Endangered Species Act.95 The
Court examined the other words listed in the statute’s definition of “take,”
and found that the wide range of words (such as “harass” and “pursue”)
included in the definition indicated Congress’s intent to impart a broad
meaning to the word “take,” beyond its “established meaning.”96 Unlike
the statute in Babbitt, the language of the Refugee Act does not indicate an
intent to create broad and variable interpretations of protected statutes, but
rather should be interpreted uniformly as classes that represent characteris-
tics that “the members of the group either cannot change, or should not
be required to change because it is fundamental to their individual identi-
ties or consciences.”97 The social visibility requirement is a deviation from
this uniform interpretation, as many groups recognized under the other
protected grounds would arguably not satisfy the social visibility require-
ment since they would not be deemed visible to general society.98 Imput-
ing a social visibility requirement to only the definition of a particular
social group and not to the other four protected grounds disrupts the uni-
form establishment of the protected grounds that Congress intended. As
such, the social visibility requirement should not be granted deference
under Chevron step one.
B. Chevron Step Two: The Social Visibility Requirement is an
Impermissible Construction of the Refugee Act of 1980
If the Supreme Court were to hold that Congress has been silent or
ambiguous to the definition of a particular social group, the BIA’s social
visibility requirement should not be entitled to Chevron deference under
the “step two” analysis because it is an impermissible interpretation of the
statute. The Supreme Court has historically looked to legislative history
93. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B) (vesting courts with the power to review denials of dis-
cretionary relief). But cf. 8 USC § 1158(a) (regarding eligibility for asylum).
94. 515 U.S. 687 (1995).
95. Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1532 (1973).
96. Babbitt, 515 U.S. at 697–98 n.10.
97. Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233.
98. For example, the Ninth Circuit granted asylum to a Ukrainian businessman who re-
ported police and lower-level government corruption to higher government officials, though his
identity as a whistleblower was unknown throughout society. See Fedunyak v. Gonzales, 477
F.3d 1126, 1129–30 (9th Cir. 2007). Courts have also held that refusing to practice one’s relig-
ion in an effort to not be recognizable to the rest of society did not negate a well-founded fear of
future persecution. See, e.g., Kazemzadeh v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 577 F.3d 1341, 1353–55 (11th
Cir. 2009); see generally Edu v. Holder, 624 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2010).
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and overall purpose behind a statute to determine whether an agency’s
interpretation is a permissible one.99 As Bresnahan discusses in her note,
the overall purpose of the Refugee Act was to codify the U.S.’s obligations
as signatories to the 1967 Protocol. The social visibility requirement is
inconsistent with the UNHCR interpretation of the Protocol, and as such,
deviates from the purpose of the Refugee Act, and thus is an impermissible
construction of the statute.
The Court in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca found that the legislative his-
tory of the Refugee Act was an important tool in interpreting the overall
purpose of the statute.100 The Court held that one of the key aspects to
understanding the history and therefore the broad purpose of the Refugee
Act is the “abundant evidence of an intent to conform the definition of
‘refugee’ and our asylum law to the United Nations Protocol . . .”101 Con-
ference Committee Reports from the drafting process for the 1980 Refu-
gee Act confirm the Court’s finding that the Refugee Act was intended as
a codification of the U.S.’s international obligations as signatory to the
1967 Protocol. The original Senate bill incorporated the “internationally-
accepted” definition of refugee contained in the Refugee Convention and
the 1967 Protocol.102 The House of Representatives amendment also “in-
corporated the U.N. definition.”103 Congress codified the Refugee Act’s
definition of refugee “with the understanding that it is based directly upon
the language of the Protocol and it is intended that the provision will be
construed consistent with the Protocol.”104
Drawing on the legislative history of the statute, the Supreme Court
made it clear that an interpretation of the Refugee Act requires allegiance
to the text of the 1967 Protocol.105 The Protocol declares the UNHCR to
99. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
843 (1984).
100. 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
101. Id. at 432. Antonin Scalia and Bryan Garner criticize the use of legislative history to
interpret a statute, stating, “From the beginnings of the republic, American law followed what is
known as the ‘no-recourse doctrine’—that in the interpretation of a text, no recourse may be
had to legislative history.” SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 89, at 369. They also criticize the
“false notion that the purpose of interpretation is to discover intent” where a statute has been
written by multiple authors, “especially multiple authors who may not have had the same objects
in mind.” Id at 391.
102. S. Rep. No. 96-590, at 20 (1980).
103. H. R. No. 96-781, at 19 (1980).
104. Id. at 20.
105. See INS, 480 U.S. at 432 (holding the standard for determining a well-founded fear of
future persecution must conform with the definition in the 1967 Protocol). But see INS v.
Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 427 (1999) (holding the U.N. Handbook “may be a useful
interpretive aid, but it is not binding on the Attorney General, the BIA, or United States courts”
when interpreting the text of the 1967 Protocol); Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 221 (B.I.A.
1985) (determining that the BIA must follow the terms of the 1967 Protocol, but finding,
“[w]hile we do not consider the UNHCR’s position in the Handbook to be controlling, the
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be the official interpreting body and supervisor of its implementation.106
As previously stated, the UNHCR Guidelines on membership of a “par-
ticular social group” do not pose a social visibility requirement, but rather
require a group either share a common, immutable characteristic or be per-
ceived as a unit by society. Therefore, to heed the plain purpose of the
Refugee Act would require deference to our international obligations
under the 1967 Protocol and thus a rejection of the social visibility re-
quirement, as it is inconsistent with the UNHCR’s definition of a particu-
lar social group. The BIA and other American courts should specifically
adopt the UNHCR’s definition of a particular social group, which in-
cludes the immutable characteristic approach outlined in Acosta.
III. ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS REVIEW
Even if the social visibility requirement were granted administrative
deference under Chevron, the interpretation is unlawful because it is the
result of arbitrary and capricious reasoning under the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act.107 In National Cable and Telecommunications Association v. Brand
X Internet Services, the Supreme Court held an administrative interpretation
of a statute is procedurally arbitrary and capricious if it is inconsistent with
past agency interpretations and the agency does not provide a “reasoned
explanation” that “adequately justifies” the inconsistency.108 This Com-
ment agrees with Bresnahan’s argument that the BIA’s social visibility re-
quirement is a sudden and unjustified departure from prior administrative
interpretations, and as such, is arbitrary and capricious under Brand X.109
Additionally, this Comment argues that the BIA’s failure to consider rele-
vant factors, including limitation of the requirement to the group’s visibil-
ity to the persecutor, rather than society in general, also merits a finding of
arbitrary and capricious reasoning.110
As Bresnahan argues, the BIA’s social visibility requirement is incon-
sistent with both international law and its own case law. By imposing the
Handbook nevertheless is a useful tool to the extent that it provides us with one internationally
recognized interpretation of the Protocol.”).
106. 1967 Protocol, supra note 18, at art. II, para. 1 (“The States Parties to the present
Protocol undertake to co-operate with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees . . . in the exercise of its functions, and shall in particular facilitate its duty of supervis-
ing the application of the provisions of the present Protocol.”).
107. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006) (“The reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside
agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discre-
tion, or otherwise not in accordance with law . . . .”).
108. 545 U.S. 967, 1000–01 (2005).
109. Bresnahan, supra note 26, at 666–73.
110. See Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476, 477 (2011) (finding the BIA failed to consider
relevant factors, such as an immigrant’s ties to his community and his overall fitness to reside in
the country, when charging removable aliens under exclusion grounds rather than grounds for
removal).
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requirement, the BIA effectively overrules many of its own previous deci-
sions finding certain socially invisible characteristics sufficient to establish a
particular social group. For example, the BIA granted asylum to the re-
spondent in Matter of Toboso-Alfonso on account of his membership in a
particular social group, “homosexuals” in Cuba.111 However, in its analy-
sis, the BIA did not address whether or not gay men were socially visible in
Cuban society.112 The BIA also found “young women who are members
of the Tchamba-Kunsutu Tribe of northern Togo who have not been sub-
jected to female genital mutilation, as practiced by that tribe, and who
oppose the practice” to be a particular social group in Matter of Kasinga,
despite the fact that the respondent’s membership in this group was recog-
nized only by her immediate family.113 Such internal inconsistencies with-
out a basis for justification were the impetus behind the Seventh Circuit’s
rejection of the social visibility requirement, finding the BIA was effec-
tively “usurp[ing] the agency’s responsibilities” by “picking and choos-
ing” which particular social groups fulfilled the social visibility
requirement, and by not conducting a social visibility analysis at all for
some groups.114
The BIA has also failed to give an adequate justification for its impo-
sition of the social visibility requirement, nor has it explained the inconsis-
tent results the requirement has created. Bresnahan notes the BIA’s
attempted justification of the social visibility requirement in Matter of S-E-
G- as “giv[ing] greater specification to the definition of a social group”115
does not sufficiently address the deviation from the innate characteristic
framework set forth in Acosta.116 The BIA attempted to classify the social
visibility requirement as a specification, where in reality it is a change in
interpretation that effectively overrules previous particular social group de-
terminations. Further, the BIA also attempted to justify the social visibility
doctrine by stating it is consistent with federal circuits’ definitions of par-
ticular social group.117 However, the BIA cannot use federal circuit com-
pliance as grounds for justification of its social visibility requirement, since
the Third and Seventh Circuits have explicitly rejected the requirement.
Thus, the BIA’s attempts to justify its inconsistency are clearly insufficient
to suspend a finding of arbitrariness and capriciousness in the social visibil-
ity requirement.118
111. Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. 819, 822 (B.I.A. 1990).
112. Id. at 820–23.
113. Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 358 (B.I.A. 1996).
114. Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 616 (7th Cir. 2009).
115. S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 582 (B.I.A. 2008).
116. Bresnahan, supra note 26, at 667.
117. S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 583.
118. The Supreme Court has held inconsistent interpretations not to be arbitrary and ca-
pricious where adequate justification is provided. See F.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556
U.S. 502, 519 (2009) (stating that the FCC’s justification that increased expletive censorship
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The BIA has also failed to justify its reasoning behind the social visi-
bility requirement in part due to its refusal to consider certain factors that
are relevant to the determination of whether a person’s circumstances
merit a grant of asylum.119 To avoid a finding of procedural arbitrary and
capricious reasoning, “[t]he BIA’s approach must be tied . . . to the pur-
poses of the immigration laws or the appropriate operation of the immi-
gration system.”120 The inherent purpose of granting asylum is to protect
people from those who seek to persecute them because of a protected
status. The BIA’s social visibility requirement involves consideration of
factors, namely the visibility of the group to society in general, that are not
germane to the decision of whether someone will be persecuted based on
a protected status. In determining whether someone is a member of a pro-
tected group, it is the persecutor’s awareness of an asylum applicant’s mem-
bership in a particular social group that should be relevant to their status as
a refugee. Instead, the BIA’s social visibility requirement inherently im-
poses a requirement that general society—not the persecutor—recognize
this protected status.
A persecutor’s motive is the result of his perception of the protected
characteristic in another: someone would not kill a young man because he
refused gang membership if he was not aware that the young man refused
gang membership. Because the Supreme Court has held that persecutor’s
motive is a relevant factor in an asylum adjudication, and because a perse-
cutor’s motive is directly linked to his perception of the applicant’s pro-
tected characteristic, it logically follows that the persecutor’s ability—
rather than the ability of society at large—to perceive a particular social
group is a relevant factor in establishing a particular social group.121
The persecutor’s awareness of the victim’s protected status has been
emphasized in cases adjudicating asylum on other protected grounds. In
INS v. Elias-Zacarias, the persecutor’s motive for persecution was held to
be a “critical” piece of evidence that the applicant must provide in order to
establish feared persecution on account of political opinion.122 In that case,
the applicant, who feared persecution from guerillas on account of his re-
fusal to join them, was denied asylum because he inadequately proved that
the persecutors were motivated by the applicant’s political opinion against
serves the government’s interest in “providing for the well-being of its youth” is sufficient to
account for the agency’s policy change that finds the use of the f- and s- words indecent).
119. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 534 (2007) (finding the E.P.A. arbitrarily and
capriciously refused to regulate certain vehicle emissions because it did not consider or justify its
non-consideration as to whether greenhouse gasses cause or contribute to climate change).
120. Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476, 478 (2011).
121. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 483 (1992) (“[S]ince the [Refugee Act] makes
motive critical, [the applicant] must provide some evidence of it, direct or circumstantial.”).
122. Id. at 483.
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guerilla activity.123 The Court held that the Refugee Act “makes motive
critical” and applicants “must provide some evidence of it. . . .”124
The BIA’s emphasis is thus misplaced when it requires that members
of the general public, who are often far removed from the persecutory acts,
recognize this protected characteristic in social group members. Many asy-
lum applicants who deserve refugee status fear persecution because they
belong to a group that is secretive or unobvious, but that the government,
their family, or organized crime members clearly recognize. Society’s rec-
ognition of a characteristic that establishes a particular social group, such as
homosexuality or land ownership status, is ultimately irrelevant to whether
the applicant will face persecution on account of this protected ground
unless the applicant fears persecution from society as a whole. The consid-
eration of the visibility of a person’s protected status to the general public
is an irrelevant factor that the BIA has not only considered, but requires for
the establishment of a particular social group.
The BIA’s refusal to address the importance of the persecutor’s per-
ception of a particular social group, rather than the perception of society at
large, indicates arbitrary and capricious reasoning.
IV. THE FLOODGATES CONCERN
Finally, Bresnahan’s note also discusses the BIA’s use of the social
visibility requirement as insurance against the historic “floodgates” con-
cern: the constant fear of adjudicators and other government officials that
ambiguity in asylum law will cause an inundation of eligible applicants.125
The BIA has used the social visibility requirement to create a more “dis-
crete” class of persons that prevents the establishment of a particular social
group with “a large swath of potential members.”126 Bresnahan argues that
this concern is frivolous since an asylum applicant must not only establish
membership in a particular social group, but must also demonstrate she
fears persecution on account of that membership.127 It is important to note
the constraints the other elements of asylum, such as the nexus require-
ment, place on the floodgates concern. Even if someone is found to be a
member of a particular social group, she still must establish that her fear of
future persecution rises to a well-founded fear, and the government is unable
or unwilling to control her potential persecutors. The asylum applicant is
123. Id.
124. Id. It is important to note that while respondent’s claim was based on political opin-
ion, the Court in Elias-Zacarias did not hold that the persecutor’s motive was critical only in
political opinion cases, suggesting the persecutor’s motive for persecuting an asylum applicant is
clearly important in every protected ground.
125. Bresnahan, supra note 26, at 675.
126. A-M-E- & J-G-U, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69, 74–76 (B.I.A. 2007).
127. Bresnahan, supra note 26, at 675.
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required to meet her burden of proof for each element,128 creating a com-
plex and difficult system that prevents courts and the government from an
inundation of meritorious asylum applications.
For example, if the social visibility requirement had not been im-
posed in Matter of S-E-G-, the nexus requirement and standard for proving
well-founded fear would have controlled potential floodgates concerns.
“Salvadorian youth who have been subjected to recruitment by efforts by
MS13” should have constituted a particular social group under the immu-
table characteristic approach, because members in this group share a past
experience that they are unable to go back in time to change.129 The
shared past experience is not generally applicable in society and thus clearly
creates a discrete and particular social group. Even though this group could
be large in number, each potential applicant would still need to prove that
the facts of his or her own experience create a well-founded fear of future
persecution, and that the persecution is based on their refusal to be re-
cruited by a gang.
It is also important to note that the Refugee Act already provides
safeguards against floodgates concerns. As Bresnahan notes, successful asy-
lum applicants must provide corroborating evidence and/or credible testi-
mony to an Immigration Judge. They must not fall outside the one-year
bar period130 or trigger the terrorism or persecutor bars.131 All of these
steps exist to ensure that adjudicators only grant asylum to people who
deserve protection under the Refugee Act. By attempting to achieve these
goals through the social visibility requirement, the BIA has deviated from
Congress’ intended methods to address potential floodgates concerns.
The BIA’s use of social visibility as a preemptive measure to avoid
large particular social groups132 also violates the U.S.’s international obli-
gations as a 1967 Protocol signatory. The UNHCR Guidelines specifically
128. Each element of asylum is multifaceted and contains multiple requirements. For ex-
ample, in establishing a well-founded fear of future persecution, an applicant must establish (1)
she has a subjective fear of future persecution and (2) the fear is objectively supported by articul-
able reasons. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 450 (1987).
129. S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 579 (B.I.A. 2008); see also Fuentes, 19 I. & N. Dec. 658,
662 (B.I.A. 1988) (status as a former national policeman is an immutable characteristic);
Sepulveda v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 770, 771–72 (7th Cir. 2006) (former subordinates of the attor-
ney general); Koudriachova v. Gonzales, 490 F.3d 255, 262–63 (2d Cir. 2007) (former KGB
agents); Cruz-Navarro v. INS, 232 F.3d 1024, 1029 (9th Cir. 2000) (former members of police
or military).
130. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B) (2012) (“[The refugee definition] shall not apply to an
alien unless the alien demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that the application has
been filed within 1 year after the date of the alien’s arrival in the United States.”).
131. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(2012) (excerpting from refugee definition aliens who
have persecuted others, been convicted of a particularly serious crime or serious nonpolitical
crime, pose a danger to national security, have participated in terrorist activities under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(i), or who were firmly resettled in another country).
132. S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 584 (noting the size of a particular social group can be an
“important factor in determining whether the group would be recognized”).
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state that size should not be a relevant factor in establishing a particular
social group.133 Size is not a consideration in the establishment of the other
protected grounds: members of a nationality or race may extend to entire
countries or regions. For example, a political opinion may be shared by the
majority of a population, yet is still grounds for asylum status if the govern-
ment persecutes people who share it. The express intent of the interna-
tional community is therefore not to limit the size of protected classes, but
rather to rely on the other elements of asylum and other procedural safe-
guards to ensure refugee status eligibility only to those who truly deserve
it. Because the social visibility doctrine abrogates the functions of other
elements of the refugee definition, it risks denying refugee status to those
who clearly deserve it.
CONCLUSION
The BIA should not be granted any interpretive deference in its im-
position of the social visibility requirement for establishing a particular so-
cial group. The requirement is clearly contrary to congressional intent in
drafting the Refugee Act and an impermissible interpretation of the stat-
ute. Further, the BIA has failed to provide adequate justification for the
inconsistent results the social visibility requirement produces, suggesting
the agency’s reasoning behind the requirement is arbitrary and capricious.
As Bresnahan concludes, the Supreme Court should adopt the
UNHCR’s either immutable characteristic or social perception approach.
Under this framework, social visibility is sufficient but not necessary to
establishing a particular social group. Because the social visibility require-
ment excludes many possible refugees who deserve protection under the
Refugee Act, and because it is inconsistent with the purpose of the statute
and the BIA’s prior holdings, social visibility should not be required, but
should be an alternative to the common, immutable character test in
Acosta. The social visibility of a group should be evaluated where a group
lacks immutable characteristics. For example, a group that is defined by its
youth or by its occupation may not fulfill the Acosta standards. In many of
these cases, a social group could be defined by a common characteristic
that is widely perceived in society, but that might eventually change and is
therefore not immutable. In these limited circumstances, the social visibil-
ity of the group could be weighed in deciding whether the shared charac-
teristic establishes a particular social group.
Concerns that the social visibility requirement is necessary to prevent
a flood of asylum grants based on membership in a particular social group
are unfounded. The abundance of safeguards, such as the one-year bar and
the credibility requirement, as well as an applicant’s need to prove the
other elements of asylum, ensure that asylum is not granted to people who
are not meant to be afforded the statute’s protection. Thus, the social visi-
133. UNHCR Guidelines, supra note 35, at para. 18.
176 Michigan Journal of Race & Law [VOL. 19:153
bility requirement does not advance the purpose of the Refugee Act in any
way and only risks a confusing, inconsistent, and ineffective application of
American law.
